Tenho escrito bastante sobre Marcelo Oliveira, o pressionado técnico do Palmeiras. Seu currículo recente é inegável. Nos últimos três anos ele conquistou três títulos importantes: o bicampeonato nacional pelo Cruzeiro, em 2013 e 2014, e a Copa do Brasil, pelo seu atual clube, no ano passado. Antes das conquistas nacionais, fez um excelente trabalho no Coritiba. Continue reading O treinador que não treina
Chapecoense have taken an early lead against Palmeiras. The visitors look rattled and the hosts push for a second goal. Palmeiras left-back Egídio is caught out of position and winger Willian Bárbio is put through one-on-one with the goalkeeper. Bárbio hesitates, Egídio recovers, goes to ground and steals the ball. Bárbio is left writhing in pain on the edge of the box. Referee Jaílson Freitas blows his whistle. Free-kick. Red card.
Palmeiras players are furious, while television pictures show viewers at home that Egídio did in fact win the ball cleanly and there was no foul. Another replay shows the assistant referee, the closest official to the incident, opting not to raise his flag. It would appear that the decision to send off Egídio came from Freitas himself, who was lagging behind the play, still inside the centre circle.
Four minutes of debate ensue on the pitch. Palmeiras players appeal to the referee while Chapecoense prepare to take their free-kick. Suddenly, Freitas gets a word in his earpiece and goes to speak to his assistant. The fourth official joins them. “He got the ball? Only the ball?” the referee is seen asking the fourth official. After receiving confirmation, Freitas overturns his decision. Goal-kick to Palmeiras. Continue reading Sending off and on again
In Brazilian football, coaches are scandalously overvalued. Tite, manager of league leaders Corinthians, earns a reported R$ 500,000 (approximately £85,000) a month. The league’s best player, Renato Augusto (once of Bayer Leverkusen), earns R$ 100,000 less. Corinthians have many players on salaries between $ 400,000 and R$ 500,000, but no-one earns as much as the coach.
Take Manchester City as a comparison. Manager Manuel Pellegrini earns £325,000 a month, while the vast majority of his squad receive far more. Sergio Agüero, City’s highest earner, is paid almost three times more than his coach.
The root of this skewed economy lies in the regularity with which teams change coaches. After 28 rounds of play, this year’s Brazilian championship has seen 24 managers sacked or resign. Only four teams have yet to substitute their head coach. Continue reading The coach
The quarter finals of Brazil’s domestic cup competition, the Copa do Brasil, get underway this midweek. Recently adapted to include all top-flight teams (those participating in the Copa Libertadores were previously exempt) and align its final stages to the last few months of the league season, the Copa has become one of the biggest attractions of Brazilian football’s long and packed calendar. It provides full stadiums, quality football and quenches the Brazilian fan’s thirst for knockout tournaments.
The Copa do Brasil is quite different from most of the traditional European domestic cups, owing more of a debt to Spain’s Copa del Rey in its two-legged format. Major upsets are rare, while the idea of a “cup run” is alien. Due to Brazilian teams’ overcrowded fixture lists, competing seriously in the Copa is a calculated choice as opposed to naturally building momentum.
Challenging in both the league and cup is difficult. It is no coincidence that at this late stage in the tournament, Corinthians and Atlético Mineiro, 1st and 2nd in the league, are already eliminated from the cup. Continue reading Who’s up for the Cup?
After losing 4-1 at home to Palmeiras on Wednesday, Fluminense dismissed head coach Enderson Moreira with just under three months of the season remaining. Less than 24 hours later, they announced Sport Recife’s Eduardo Baptista as his replacement. The team’s form has dipped sharply, from top four challengers to winning just two of their last 13 league matches. They currently lie in 11th place and rock bottom of the form table.
This is hardly surprising when you consider that Fluminense have just hired their third different head coach of the league season, their fourth in 2015. Continue reading This Is The End(erson)
“Palmeiras beat Figueirense at home and win again after three matches” – FOLHA DE S.PAULO
Palmeiras earned an important home victory this evening, beating struggling Figueirense 2-0 in São Paulo. Both goals came in the second half – the first from a corner kick and the second from the penalty spot.
The scoreline was misleading though, as Palmeiras delivered yet another below-par performance.
A look at the cold, hard figures would suggest Palmeiras to be one of the most dominant sides in Brazil. They boast the league’s best attack with 41 goals in 25 games, while their shots on target ratio (shots on target for/shots on target against, a reliable indicator of team performance) is 1.48, also the best in the league. Against Figueirense, they had six shots on target to the away side’s two.
Yet they sit in fifth place, outside of the top four and 13 points behind leaders Corinthians.
So what is to blame for their underwhelming league position? Arguably, their form has dipped just as their rivals have improved. Continue reading Palmeiras win, but fail to impress
Rigorous restructuring and zealous transfer policy put Palmeiras in good shape for 2015 after centenary disaster
This is the second piece in a series of previews of the forthcoming Brazilian football season. The first in the sequence, focusing on chronic calendar problems and the fortunes of the two big Minas Gerais clubs, Cruzeiro and Atlético Mineiro, can be found here.
Last season, I dedicated an above-average amount of space on this blog to discussing Palmeiras. Justifiably so, as their political meltdown and anencephalic management has been one of modern Brazilian football’s major tragedies. Once regarded among the biggest and toughest clubs in the country, two relegations in the space of a decade and perennial battles against the drop have, for the time being, wounded Palmeiras’ reputation. Were they to be involved in another survival scrap in 2015, the club’s stature could suffer irreparable damage.
Early signs for this year, however, are promising. Firstly (and crucially), after the annus horribilis of 2014 where Palmeiras ricocheted head-first from one disaster to another and very nearly found themselves relegated amid muted centennial celebrations, club president Paulo Nobre has recognised that major changes must be made. This may not sound like an earth-shattering revelation, but is a welcoming change from previous regimes who have played down such disasters, such as that of Mustafá Contursi who, after Palmeiras were relegated in 2002, stated that football would become “third priority” at the club, promising to instead focus on improving facilities at their exclusive social club in the leafy, upmarket neighbourhood of Perdizes in São Paulo’s expanded centre. The first step to recovery is admitting you have a problem, which Nobre, with his zealous attitude towards restructuring Palmeiras’ department of football, appears to have done.
Before dealing with the playing squad, the first changes made at Palmeiras for 2015 came off the pitch. Head coach Dorival Junior, director of football José Carlos Brunoro and his right-hand man Omar Feitosa were all dismissed, with Oswaldo de Oliveira, Alexandre Mattos and Cícero Souza brought in as their respective replacements. Oddly enough, it was Mattos, Palmeiras’ new director of football, whose appointment grabbed the most headlines.
The excitement around Alexandre Mattos – not a 20 goal-a-season centre-forward capped by the Brazilian national team but an executive with an MBA in Sports Management – stems from the fact he was Cruzeiro’s director of football during their two consecutive national championship-winning seasons. The off-the-pitch administration of the Belo Horizonte club, as I discussed earlier this week, is widely regarded to have been a crucial part in their success, and Mattos was responsible for the majority of Cruzeiro’s intelligent transfer dealings over the last three years.
Upon arrival, Mattos received the full VIP treatment. He was unveiled at the club’s training ground, handed a replica shirt and gave a press conference which was packed to the rafters with journalists. The entire affair is worrying for the future of the Brazilian game, where a director of football is treated as a marquee transfer. Mattos will undoubtedly help things run smoother at Palmeiras, while his intelligence, work ethic and connections should allow them to build a stronger playing squad. The supporters should not get carried away, however. Directors don’t win football matches.
The new coach, Oswaldo de Oliveira, appears to be a smart appointment but, like his director of football, he cannot be expected to transform the club’s fortunes on his own. Oswaldo has been around the block in Brazilian football, with his move to Palmeiras making him the first coach in history to coach all eight major clubs from São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. More importantly, he has evolved over the course of his coaching career, particularly in his four years spent in Japanese football with Kashima Antlers, where he won every trophy available to him. His strategic nous and man management abilities will be important if Palmeiras are to have a good year in 2015.
After cleaning up behind-the-scenes, Nobre, Mattos & co. could turn their attentions to the playing squad. The clear-out of deadwood, promised for years at the club, appears to have finally happened. Twenty-one players have been let go or told under no uncertain terms that they should look for another club, while several others should also leave Palmeiras before the start of the national championship in May.
Oswaldo de Oliveira has made it clear to the Palmeiras directors that he would like to work with a squad of 34: four goalkeepers and three players for each position in his preferred 4-2-3-1 tactical system, preferably with the third-string option being from the youth system. Consequently, the club have wasted no time in signing several players for the new season. At the time of writing, 15 incoming transfers have been announced in the last eight days.
After Palmeiras confirmed the arrival of four new recruits this Monday alone, leading sports news portal Globoesporte.com ran a sarcastic headline the following day, registering their shock that the club had “not announced any new signings in over 12 hours”, before reporting that Alan Patrick of Shakhtar Donetsk had joined on a one-year deal.
However, while old regimes at Palmeiras have adopted a cheap and cheerful approach to the transfer market, recruitment for 2015 has been primarily concerned with quality and necessity.
Among the new faces are Zé Roberto (of Bayern Munich fame), Coritiba playmaker Robinho, explosive Porto forward Kelvin, Internacional centre-back Jackson and Goiás captain Amaral. Oswaldo de Oliveira has also brought in some of his favourites from his strong Botafogo team of 2013, with right-back Lucas, centre-forward Rafael Marques and promising young defensive midfielder Gabriel all wearing the famous green jersey in 2015.
The club are still hoping to finalise the transfer of Santos’ defensive midfielder Arouca, who has taken his current club to court over months of unpaid wages. Were he to succeed in his legal case, he will be free to sign for Palmeiras, where the number 5 shirt has already been reserved for him.
Perhaps the transfer that created most commotion, however, was that of speedy Dynamo Kiev winger Dudu. The 22-year-old, who spent the 2014 season on loan at Grêmio, became the subject of interest for a number of Brazilian clubs in this preseason. His Ukrainian owners were unwilling to allow Dudu to go out on loan again, instead wanting to cash in on the player. Flamengo and Internacional had offers rejected, before Corinthians appeared to reach an agreement to bring the winger to Itaquera.
Dudu seemed set for Corinthians, in an interview with news portal Terra he spoke as if the deal had already been completed. However, rivals São Paulo hijacked the deal, prompting a drawn-out transfer novela which took up many column inches in Brazil’s sports dailies. It was your classic tug-of-war: one day Dudu was a Corinthians player, the next he was ready to be announced by São Paulo, then Corinthians, São Paulo, Corinthians, São Paulo…
Corinthians, struggling financially, appeared to drop out of the race, leaving Dudu free to sign for their rivals. Final contract discussions were scheduled and the club appeared to finally have their man. Then, out of the blue, on an otherwise quiet Sunday morning, Dudu was announced as having signed not for São Paulo, not for Corinthians, but for Palmeiras.
As it turned out, Alexandre Mattos had been holding surreptitious contact with Dudu’s agents and was able to agree terms to bring the player to Allianz Parque. Reportedly, the winger went into the final contract talks with São Paulo already aware of the agreement made with Palmeiras.
For a club surrounded by rivals and with dangerously low self-esteem, gazumping both Corinthians and São Paulo to sign a player is huge for the ego of many long-suffering Palmeiras supporters. “If anyone didn’t respect Palmeiras before (…), from now on, they will have to,” boasted Mattos.
This transfer saga was the latest in a long line of disputes between Palmeiras and São Paulo, whose deep-seated rivalry dates back to the 1940s, when the latter club attempted to seize Palmeiras’ stadium, claiming they (who had just been forced to change their name from Palestra Italia) were connected to the Axis powers of the Second World War. This perceived betrayal was made all the worse by the fact that a decade earlier, Palmeiras had organised a charity tournament to save a nascent São Paulo from bankruptcy.
The current presidents of both clubs, Paulo Nobre and São Paulo’s Carlos Miguel Aidar, are not on speaking terms and have used their platforms of influence to enact their petty squabbles. This behaviour can only hurt all elements involved: in the case of Dudu, the commotion created by his transfer will increase expectations upon him to insane levels, so much so that it will be almost impossible for the player to adequately live up to the hype surrounding him. In financial terms, Palmeiras are probably overpaying for Dudu (only time will tell) and São Paulo were very nearly drawn into paying the player R$400,000 (around £100,000) per month in wages, at the same time the board are about to announce a deficit of R$71 million for 2014.
The disagreement has no end in sight, as only yesterday São Paulo managed to hijack Palmeiras’ impending transfer for Ponte Preta attacker Jonathan Cafu. Although Nobre’s club are in a healthier financial position, neither can afford to enter into a pissing contest.
Though almost every piece of news coming out of Palmeiras this preseason has been positive, all involved with the club must keep their feet planted firmly on the ground. Palmeiras fans have become conditioned to hoping for the best and expecting the worst, and though they may yet have plenty to celebrate come December with their remarkably competitive squad, it is important to be realistic and recognise the club’s sole objective in 2015 is not to win trophies or qualify for the Copa Libertadores, but to win back their self-respect and avoid being involved in another relegation fight.
Next time, Santos in trouble: coastal club set to take Palmeiras’ place in the danger zone amid financial chaos.
Cover image: Fernando Dantas / Gazeta Press
A century after the club’s foundation by a group of Italian immigrants in São Paulo, 2014 was meant to be a year of celebration for Palmeiras. However, thanks to a string of woeful executive decisions, their centennial turned out to be their annus horribilis, with Verdão fans left desperate to ring in the New Year as soon as possible.
With their return to Brazil’s first division, the impending inauguration of their gorgeous new stadium Allianz Parque and the small matter of the club’s centenary celebrations, Palmeiras supporters demanded the board spare no expense and think big for the 2014 season. Initially, it seemed those in charge would oblige. Prestigious managerial candidates were interviewed and potential multi-million signings were floated, but club president Paulo Nobre’s obsession for austerity spoke louder.
The quality reinforcements did not come, Palmeiras instead brought in aging world champion centre-back Lúcio on a free transfer (out of action for six months after being dropped by rivals São Paulo) and loaned Uruguayan defender Mauricio Victorino (on the sidelines for over a year with a heel injury) and midfielder Bruno César, who arrived from Saudi Arabia comically overweight. Jobbing head coach Gilson Kleina, who led the team to the second division title in 2013, was kept on, although it was made abundantly clear he was not their first choice and would walk the plank should results falter.
The nightmare began with the São Paulo state championship: Palmeiras progressed from the first stage without any major surprises, but in their quarter-final match against minnows Ituano, they were beaten 1-0 and eliminated in front of their own fans. Kleina kept his job, but would receive his inevitable marching orders two months later, after only three matches of the Brazilian championship campaign.
As if that was not sufficiently suicidal, Paulo Nobre then pulled off his most ambitious (and under the circumstances, short-sighted) move of a disastrous year and brought in Argentinian coach Ricardo Gareca to replace Kleina. Intelligent and forward-thinking, Gareca came highly recommended after some great years in his homeland with Vélez Sarsfield, but when thrown into the hectic environment that is the Palmeiras training ground, with the league season already well underway, he was destined to fail.
Gareca’s Palmeiras showed some promising signs, their midfield looked more organised than it had been in a long time, but a leaky defence, lack of mental toughness and a complete inability to hold onto results saw them plummet to the lower half of the table. There was also reports that some members of the squad were less than happy about playing under an Argentinian manager.
Foreign coaches are almost unheard of in Brazilian football and Ricardo Gareca’s scandalously brief stint in São Paulo will do nothing to help that. Granted, the universal preference for home-grown coaches in Brazil is not a matter of prejudice or intolerance, there are practical motives behind it. In general, Brazilian players respond best to coaches who are able to relate to and mentor them. The harsh reality is that many footballers in Brazil come from poorer backgrounds and may have had to leave their family at an early age. In these cases, the football coach fills the role of a father figure, something which cannot be achieved across a language barrier.
The Argentinian was given a grand total of nine league matches over the space of six weeks before getting the sack, this coming after the club had spent an approximated R$ 30 million (around £7 million) to bring in four Argentinian players, Fernando Tóbio, Pablo Mouche, Agustín Allione and Jonathan Cristaldo on Gareca’s request.
Trying to salvage something from an already disappointing centenary, Paulo Nobre rushed to appoint Gareca’s replacement, announcing Dorival Júnior, the bespectacled former Palmeiras midfielder fresh from a string of managerial failures at Flamengo, Vasco and Fluminense, as the man tasked with keeping the Verdão in the first division.
Thanks to some naïve tactical choices, bad luck with injuries, his reluctance to play his four unhappy Argentinians and a crippling mental inferiority that spread throughout the entire squad, Dorival very nearly commanded Palmeiras to their third relegation in the 21st century.
After some embarrassing results (a 6-0 defeat to Goiás, a 2-0 defeat at home to Atlético Mineiro’s B team and losing 2-0 to Sport Recife in the inaugural game at the stunning Allianz Parque), Palmeiras went into the last match of the season needing (at the very least) a point at home against Atlético Paranaense to avoid the drop. Their opponents had no stake in the result and fielded a reserve side, but Palmeiras coughed and spluttered to a 1-1 draw with the help of a dubious first-half penalty kick. The Verdão’s salvation came when news filtered through that Santos (traditionally one of Palmeiras’ rivals) had scored a last-minute winner to relegate north-eastern club Vitória. The club ended the division in 16th place with 20 losses and 40 points. Since the Brazilian championship made the switch to the 38-game season, no club had ever avoided relegation with 40 points.
As it was when they won the second division last year, when their place in the first division was confirmed for 2015, there was no celebration from Palmeiras fans, with the team booed off the field accompanied by chants of “time sem vergonha!”, literally “shameless team”.
Palmeiras’ woeful performance in 2014, amid centennial celebrations, is another dent in the reputation of one of Brazil’s proudest football clubs. In the words of Brazilian journalist Mauricio Savarese, despite remaining in the first division, Palmeiras were relegated in 2014.
Next year could well be the most crucial in Palmeiras’ 100-year history. Another relegation fight (or worse, another relegation) could see them reduced to yo-yo club status, and at a time when the country’s better-run big clubs (Cruzeiro, Corinthians, Atlético Mineiro, São Paulo) are threatening to distance themselves from the rest in a way Brazilian football has never seen before, such a step down could create an insurmountable gap between Palmeiras and Brazil’s elite.
I originally wrote this blog to publish yesterday, 26 October, Palmeiras’ 100-year anniversary. I intended it to serve as a thoughtful reminder and a warning for future years. I soon realised my suggested timing would have been completely inappropriate. Although Palmeiras’ current issues are very relevant and very real, yesterday was a day to put that to one side. Yesterday was a day of celebration, to recognise the illustrious history of one of the world’s greatest football clubs. To remember the Arrancada Heróica, the Academia, the Segunda Academia, the Ataque dos 100 Gols… I, a late-in-life Palmeiras fan, would like to congratulate all of my fellow palmeirenses on the club’s 100th anniversary, and here’s to 100 more.
Palmeiras’ 1-0 win against Coritiba on Saturday evening was less than convincing, but was enough to temporarily lift the traditional São Paulo club out of the relegation zone in the Brazilian championship. Seeing big clubs near the bottom of the table is not uncommon in Brazil, with Rio de Janeiro teams Flamengo and Botafogo flirting with the drop zone already this season. However, Palmeiras have taken this phenomenon one step further, having been relegated twice since 2003 and threatening to fall once more.
Palmeiras is the fourth best supported club in Brazil (behind only Flamengo and local rivals Corinthians and São Paulo) and holds the record for the most Brazilian championship titles won, tied with Santos. However, the last of these national titles came twenty years ago and the status and reputation that comes with such an illustrious history appears to be dwindling. This latest relegation fight is made all the worse by the fact that this year is Palmeiras’ centenary, with 26 August marking the club’s 100th anniversary. What was meant to be a season of celebration could well turn out to be one to forget.
Where did it all go wrong? It is a long story that first requires some basic knowledge about the inner workings of Brazilian football clubs. Unlike the majority of European teams, football clubs in Brazil are members clubs, often encompassing a wide variety of sports and even social elements. (Palmeiras’ full name, for example, is Sociedade Esportiva Palmeiras: Palmeiras Sporting Society.) This results in a few major differences in the way these organisations are run: firstly, club administration is largely amateur (although not in a financial sense, many club presidents are well paid for their trouble), and considering that football is often not the only focus of the organisation, the club president will take care of the professional football team while also overseeing the under 15s badminton squad.
The third (and most important) difference is that club presidents in Brazil hold no personal responsibility over their conduct in running the organisation. This allows presidents to run up huge public and private debts, knowing they can sneak out the back door untouched at the end of their term.
Palmeiras’ downfall began in the late 1990s, at the tail end of a trailblazing sponsorship and co-management deal with Italian dairy corporation Parmalat. In 1992, looking for a way in to the growing Brazilian market, Parmalat approached Palmeiras and offered them an eight-year partnership, promising heavy investment in the club and professional management in exchange for an advertising platform.
Such an agreement was unheard of in Brazilian football and the positive results showed almost instantly. Palmeiras built a very strong team, paying big money for players such as Zinho, Mazinho and Edmundo and in 1993, they won the São Paulo state championship (their first trophy in 16 years) beating fierce rivals Corinthians in the final.
Palmeiras went from strength to strength under Parmalat, winning titles throughout the 90s, culminating in the 1999 Copa Libertadores trophy, making them champions of South America. The same year, the partnership with the Italian multinational came to an end and the club was handed back to its members, led by president Mustafá Contursi.
When looking deep into Palmeiras current problems, everything seems to point to Mr Contursi. A member of the club since 1951, the jowly, rotund septuagenarian has devoted most of his life to Palmeiras, but oddly for someone in his position, those close to him claim he is not much of a football fan, instead preferring the cosy confines of Palmeiras’ social club in São Paulo’s leafy Perdizes district.
Despite not receiving any further investment from Parmalat, Contursi was handed the club in a good financial position. However, in the Italians’ absence, club spending decreased dramatically, as did their results. By 2002, they had been relegated to the second division.
At the end of 2000, despite publically decrying the idea of transforming football clubs into businesses, it was revealed that Contursi had secretly opened Palmeiras SA, a private company to which the bank balance of SE Palmeiras (around $45 million at the time) had been transferred. Contursi owned shares in the company and along with his presidency at the club, this gave him absolute control over the ins and outs at Palmeiras, allowing him to sidestep usual checks and balances. A formal parliamentary investigation into the dealings of Brazil’s FA and major clubs examined Palmeiras SA and recommended a complete audit of the company’s accounts be carried out, which was never done.
Palmeiras were leaking money, but to the public eye it seemed that they were being frugal. Giving priority to other spheres of the club, Mustafá Contursi boasted about his “bom e barato” (loosely translated as “cheap and cheerful”) approach to administering the football team. He met expensive transfer proposals with flat refusals, and sent the club after players available on free transfers and from small clubs outside of the top leagues. With no requirements about the quality of the players being signed, Contursi left Palmeiras with a terribly weak squad who were duly relegated at the end of 2002.
Under allegations of fraud and claims that he was actively censoring opposition within the club, Mustafá Contursi left his post as club president in 2005, appointing Afonso Della Monica as his successor (with whom he would later have a public falling out).
The damage, unfortunately, was already done. Mustafá’s authoritarian management style split Palmeiras in two behind the scenes, completely transforming the club’s internal politics. Although he is still heavily involved, his legacy are the messy power struggles between warring factions that have been brewing since the year 2000.
“Mr Contursi still exercises major influence on Palmeiras’ political life, due to the many counsellors in the club’s Deliberative and Fiscal Councils who are loyal to him” affirms Kristian Bengtson, owner of Anything Palmeiras, the only English language source for Palmeiras news. “Any club president who attempts to ignore or oppose Mr Contursi is up for a very difficult time in office.”
Something which has become normal at Palmeiras is the constant leaking of information within the club to the press, making the club a difficult environment for players to work in. Such incidents are down to the constant power plays and one-upmanship going on behind the scenes, with members looking to ruin the reputation of a rival or increase their own standing. Flavio Canuto, one third of the excellent Mondo Verde podcast, paints a bleak picture of the future: “[The leaking to the press] is not going to change while Palmeiras has such a destructive environment where whoever loses the election spends all of their time trying to destroy whoever is in power. These politics of hate are destroying the club.”
As mentioned earlier, Contursi’s successor Afonso Della Monica originally appeared to be cut from the same cloth, having been a close ally during Contursi’s administration. However, those fearing more of the same were in for a pleasant surprise. “Unlike Mustafá, Della Monica actually liked football,” says Canuto. “He was always by the team’s side, he’d travel with the players on the team bus.”
Palmeiras reclaimed some of their status under Della Monica, but when he fell out with Contursi, the ex-president pulled some strings to introduce term limits, impeding Della Monica from running for re-election.
The outgoing president gave his support to well-known economist Luis Gonzaga Belluzzo, who went on to defeat Contursi’s candidate in the 2009 elections. Belluzzo presided over some important decisions during his single term in office, such as the agreements for the construction of a new state-of-the-art stadium (Allianz Parque, to be opened later this year), but he left the club in disgrace and financial disarray after a series of unwise signings and terrible wage management.
Belluzzo’s failure opened the door for a return to power for Contursi, who put forward Arnaldo Tirone as his preferred candidate. Tirone went on to win the election comfortably and preside over perhaps the most calamitous administrations in the club’s history, culminating in the club once again being relegated to the second division.
Nobre’s noble intentions
The day after Palmeiras suffered their second relegation in ten years, Arnaldo Tirone decided not to travel back to São Paulo, instead taking a day to himself to fully process the seriousness of his club’s predicament – by sunbathing on a beach in Rio de Janeiro. In his most intelligent decision as president of Palmeiras, Tirone decided not to run for re-election.
The winner of said election was Paulo Nobre, who at 45 years of age became the youngest Palmeiras president since 1932. Not dissimilar to Belluzzo, Nobre arrived as a respected professional, touted to drag the club out of its rut. “Expectations on Nobre were extremely high,” says Kristian Bengtson. “He was seen as the man to install an administration that would be the complete opposite of the previous and disastrous one.”
Eighteen months into his two-year mandate and the jury is still out on Nobre. “He has got a lot right, but has also got a lot wrong, particularly on the football side of things,” believes Flavio Canuto. It would be hard to argue with such an assessment.
The current president’s main objective was to bring financial stability to Palmeiras, and it is the area where he deserves the most credit. Upon his arrival, the club had a convoluted portfolio of loan commitments, with several high-interest agreements that were not viable in the long run. Nobre was successful in transforming these loans into longer deals with kinder rates, even loaning some of his own money to the club. He has also made efforts to professionalise the club’s administration and expand the Palmeiras brand with a view to increasing revenue. Those who complain that he could have done more are perhaps overlooking the fact that by the end of the Tirone regime, an approximated 70% of Palmeiras’ revenue was already occupied, leaving Nobre precious little wiggle room in which to invest in new projects.
On the other hand, Paulo Nobre is supported by Mustafá Contursi (albeit not as strongly as his predecessor) and some potential changes to the democratic system within the club (such as direct presidential elections for all paying club members, Contursi’s idea of hell) have been put firmly on the back burner.
His administration of the club in purely sporting terms also leaves a lot to be desired. Despite being a passionate Palmeiras supporter and a lover of the game, his overly frugal approach to football has left the club in the lurch. His wage austerity and stubborn negotiation style have seen potential signings refuse to join and important players leave to play for rivals. The most complete example is that of Alan Kardec, who became the club’s top scorer and outstanding performer after joining from Benfica. When the time came to renew his contract, talks quickly broke down as the president refused to budge on his first offer. Kardec, feeling undervalued at the club, signed for fierce rivals São Paulo FC and scored a late winning goal in the derby between the two sides earlier this month.
His transfer policy has also followed Contursi’s “cheap and cheerful” approach, having brought in no less than 35 players since the start of his term, with less than half of them still at the club today.
However, Nobre must be commended on the appointment of Argentine coach Ricardo Gareca. With an excellent reputation and plenty of experience around South America, Gareca arrived fresh from a successful four-year spell in charge of Vélez Sársfield and his hiring suggested Nobre had a medium to long-term project in mind for the club. What’s more, Nobre began to consult Gareca about the players he wanted Palmeiras to sign. Although Nobre’s tight grip on the club’s purse strings allowed Gareca’s number one target, Vélez striker Lucas Pratto, to slip through their hands, he has since brought in several players upon the Argentine’s request, such as Fernando Tóbio, Pablo Mouche, Agustín Allione and Jonathan Cristaldo, all of whom have gone straight into the first team.
Palmeiras are facing a more immediate problem, however, as the specter of relegation is rapping at their door once again. Losing Alan Kardec to São Paulo, as well as not being able to count on goalkeeper Fernando Prass and playmaker Jorge Valdívia due to injuries has left the squad looking bare and lacking in quality. Gareca is also passing through a period of transition and their early results have not been good at all. Before Saturday’s victory against Coritiba, the club had gone ten league games without a win.
So, what now? The consensus among fans is that even though Nobre has done well with the club’s finances, now is the time to spend and do anything necessary to drag Palmeiras out of this current mess. Gareca appears to have the support of the board, as a needless change of manager could turn out to be fatal.
“Most importantly, the board needs to understand the gravity of this situation,” says Canuto. If the club was to suffer a third relegation in the space of 12 years, all of the effort and emotional investment would have been for nothing, and there is a real fear that Palmeiras, historically one of the world’s great football clubs, would never recover. Vida longa e próspera, Palmeiras.
I’ve never made a point of concealing my allegiences within sport. Doing so, even in the realm of sports journalism, strikes me as odd and begs the question as to why one would withhold such information. To hide bias? To appear more professional or respectable?
There is a suggestion that by revealing the club you support you run the risk of estranging a large portion of your audience, opposing fans. However, the best examples of sports journalism in this country have all tied their colours to the mast at one point or another. Whether that be the corintiano Juca Kfouri, the palmeirense Paulo Vinicius Coelho, the cruzeirense Tostão or going further back to diehard Fluminense fan Nelson Rodrigues.
The honesty of revealing your favourite club is not unprofessional, most people, in fact, find it endearing. It shows that beneath the match reports and byline pictures, the journalist is a supporter, too.
I grew up in Glasgow and became a Celtic supporter at an early age. However, since becoming passionate about Brazilian football, to eventually moving here some years ago, I have developed a strong attachment to Palmeiras.
It is often said that supporting more than one football team is impossible. It certainly is possible, although it’s a gradual process. It took me a while to genuinely care for Palmeiras, initially it was more of a fondness, a preference, but as time went on (and realising the fact that my two favourite clubs have virtually zero chance of competing for the same title) that fondness became a passion.
With Celtic out of the Champions League and plodding along unchallenged toward the Scottish title, and Palmeiras stuck in the second tier throughout last year, Sunday’s dérbi paulista between Corinthians and Palmeiras was the first match in a while that I could genuinely get worked up about.
Seeing as I had no journalistic responsibilities during the match, I allowed myself to get a bit carried away. The referee was called every name under the sun (in both English and Portuguese, for a bit of variety), my head was in my hands at Romarinho’s opener and I shouted far too loudly at Alan Kardec’s late equaliser. Those are truly some of the best moments in football, and a part of me is disappointed that I can’t get so involved every week.
In my moments of clarity, I did my best to analyse the game, as after all, the dérbi came at an interesting time for both sides.
What I did notice was a big improvement from Corinthians. Under pressure, coach Mano Menezes broke away from the 4-2-3-1 system that has been used religiously by the Timão in recent years, opting instead for a 4-5-1 with three defensive-minded central midfielders. Newly-instated club captain Ralf held the fort in front of the defence, while Guilherme and debutant Bruno Henrique took turns pushing forward to attack.
Menezes’ objective was clearly to crowd the midfield, seeing as the vast majority of Palmeiras’ attacking play originates from Jorge Valdivia and Wesley. In this respect they were successful and they bossed possession for most of the match.
It will be interesting to see if Menezes sticks to this system outside of the clássico environment. I think the change could suit them: they have some fresh blood in Jadson and Bruno, as well as a different system that doesn’t make drastic changes to their general playing style.
Speaking of Jadson, the on-loan São Paulo man had a strong debut and played an important role as one of Corinthians’ wide midfielders. Without possession, he marked his opposing full-back and pressed centre-backs with the ball, while in attack he looked to drift infield and create attacking moves. He was always aware of his positioning though, which stopped Corinthians from losing their shape.
Palmeiras weren’t anywhere near as dominant as they were in their last clássico, winning 2-0 against São Paulo, but they showed signs of a maturing team and once again proved to be a close-knit unit. Aware that they were forced to surrender the midfield battle to Corinthians’ three centre-midfielders, Gilson Kleina set up his Palmeiras side a bit deeper in order to soak up Corinthians pressure.
Some of their defensive work in the first half was excellent, with a special mention to young centre-back Wellington, who was terrific and looks to be a high-level defender in the making.
Their threat on the counterattack could have been better however. Valdivia and Wesley played fairly decent games, considering the circumstances, and came close to completing some killer passes behind the Corinthians defence, but they were almost always cut out. When Palmeiras did get the ball in advantageous situations, wide attackers Mazinho and Leandro were indecisive, wasteful and generally played poorly.
A disappointing second half cost the Verdão a chance at victory, but their late equaliser shows that they are a committed and mentally tough squad, something which has been lacking at the club in recent years.
Palmeiras coach Gilson Kleina has come under a lot of unwarranted criticism at the start of the season, as the board’s choice to extend his contract during the club’s centenary year was seen by many as being unambitious. The ‘ambitious’ alternative to Kleina was Vanderlei Luxemburgo, a manager, wrapped in an ego, inside an Armani suit, who in 2013 was fired from Grêmio and relegated (albeit not for long) with Fluminense and whose last major trophy came in 2004. Go figure.
Kleina is a relatively new face at the top level of Brazilian football, despite starting his coaching career in 1999 as an assistant to Abel Braga at Coritiba. His first high-profile job came at Campinas club Ponte Preta in 2011, where he won promotion to Série A and had them punching above their weight in 2012. Palmeiras signed him to replace Luiz Felipe Scolari in a doomed attempt at escaping relegation, and last year he brought the Verdão back to the top division, comfortably winning the Série B.
He’s popular amongst the players and has managed to create a healthy atmosphere at the club, despite the presence of some inflated egos. Tactically, he isn’t the most adventurous coach, though his teams always have a defined objective and playing style, which goes a long way in domestic Brazilian football.
It’s difficult to tell how Palmeiras will fare this year, as they have largely been tested against sides at Série B level or lower, but if their performance in these recent matches against São Paulo and Corinthians are anything to go by, palmeirenses such as myself can hope for a very respectable season indeed.